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ESSAY
SOPRA? SO WHAT? CHEVRON REFORM
MISSES THE TARGET ENTIRELY
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN*
Washington D.C. is awash with proposals for regulatory reform these
days. The REINS Act,1 the Separation of Powers Restoration Act,2 the Reg-
ulatory Accountability Act,3 the One In, One Out Act,4 the RED Tape Act,5
the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act6—these are just a
few examples. The Administrative Conference of the United States has
written and maintains a list of regulatory reform legislation from 2011 to
2017. It runs seventy-four pages.7
Partly, this is a sign of our times. Congressional Republicans have
pushed regulatory reform, largely in reaction to Obama Administration reg-
ulatory actions.8 President Trump came into office promising to “drain the
* Distinguished McKnight University Professor and Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in
Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The following Essay is based on a speech delivered at
the University of St. Thomas Law Journal’s symposium, Presidential Executive Power Under the
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recording of the speech can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKNeZPp2LUo&t=
3000s. The author would like to thank the University of St. Thomas Law Journal student editors,
David Hahn, and Lesley Roe for their assistance in converting the speech into this Essay. At the
author’s request, Professor Hickman’s article may be reproduced only in its entirety or in
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1. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th Cong.
(2017).
2. Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115th Cong. (2017).
3. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017).
4. One In, One Out Act, H.R. 674, 115th Cong. (2017).
5. RED Tape Act of 2017, S. 56, 115th Cong. (2017).
6. Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2017, S. 119, 115th Cong.
(2017).
7. See Memorandum from Admin. Conference Interns on Regulatory and Admin. Reform
Legislation to Reeve Bull, Admin. Conference Research Chief (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.acus
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Regulatory%20Reform%20Legislation%20Memo%202-13-
2017.pdf.
8. E.g.,Orrin Hatch & John Ratcliffe, Sen. Hatch, Rep. Ratcliffe: It’s Time to Restore Ac-
countability to Our Runaway Bureaucracy, FOX NEWS (June 7, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/2016/06/07/sen-hatch-rep-ratcliffe-its-time-to-restore-accountability-to-our-runaway-bu-
reaucracy.html; Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the Proposed “Separation of Pow-
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swamp,” tame the bureaucrats, and scale back the regulatory state.9 But
calls for regulatory reform also reflect the fact that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) was enacted by Congress in 1946.10 The APA has gotten
creaky with age. Government practices have not only expanded in number
but changed in various ways that simply were not contemplated seventy
years ago. Most administrative law scholars, irrespective of their political
and policy preferences, agree that the APA could use some updating.
I want to focus on one particular regulatory reform proposal, the Sepa-
ration of Powers Restoration Act, or SOPRA, and its variations.11 SOPRA’s
primary target is the Chevron doctrine, which calls for judicial deference to
agency interpretations of statutes under certain circumstances.12 SOPRA is
designed to counter Auer deference13 as well, but Auer is something of an
afterthought. Curtailing Chevron is what gets the juices flowing when con-
templating SOPRA. But the SOPRA proposal has changed fairly substan-
tially from when it was introduced, and those changes reflect both the
challenges and the limitations that SOPRA encounters.
My own view is that SOPRA is aimed at the wrong target. In a recent
article, Nick Bednar and I argue that the objective of those seeking to con-
strain the administrative state should be curtailing the number of broad con-
gressional delegations of agency policymaking discretion, not eliminating
Chevron deference.14 But before I turn to that argument and to SOPRA and
its variations, a bit of background on administrative law is in order. The
evolution of SOPRA only makes sense if one understands the broader ad-
ministrative law context that surrounds the Chevron doctrine and SOPRA’s
efforts to do away with it.
To start, I will provide a very brief, simplistic history of administrative
law doctrine as it relates to Chevron. Congress has long relied on agencies
to administer regulatory statutes. Administrative law scholars like to point
to 1887 and the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission to
ers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times, JUSTICIA: VERDICT (July 26, 2016), https://
verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-proposed-separation-powers-restoration-act-
2016-sign-times.
9. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Gardiner Harris, Trump Wants to ‘Drain the Swamp,’ but
Change Will Be Complex and Costly, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/trump-government.html; CBS News, Donald Trump says it is time to
“drain the swamp” in D.C., YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2016), https://youtu.be/PxWu69vrdhA?t=31m1
5s.
10. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701-06 (2016)).
11. See infra notes 51–67 (discussing versions of SOPRA).
12. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
13. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (calling for courts to give “controlling”
weight to agency interpretations of agency regulations).
14. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392, 1461 (2017) (“To the extent that courts and commentators want to curtail the
administrative state, they should focus their efforts on rolling back congressional delegations of
policymaking discretion to agency officials rather than overturning Chevron.”).
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regulate railroads as the beginning of the modern regulatory state.15 Jerry
Mashaw has written extensively offering earlier examples dating all the
way back to the founding.16 A particularly salient example comes from sev-
eral decades after the founding but before 1887—the Steamship Safety
Commission, which was established in 1852 to develop rules for the pur-
pose of reducing the incidents of destructive, and often fatal, steamship ex-
plosions.17 Steamships exploded in the 1830s and 1840s with troubling
regularity,18 so Congress created a commission to issue rules and license
steamship operators to reduce those explosions.
Now, obviously, government has grown substantially since the found-
ing, and certainly since the mid- to late-1800s as well. What is important,
15. See, e.g., Patrick M. Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, The Genesis of Independent Agen-
cies, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 661 n.125 (2017) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 384, (1973) (noting that “[t]he creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
in 1887, has been taken to be a kind of genesis” of federal administrative law)); Keith Werhan,
The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 571 (1992) (describing
that event as “when Congress launched the modern administrative state”).
16. See Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260 (2006) (“From the earliest days of the Republic, Congress
delegated broad authority to administrators, armed them with extrajudicial coercive powers, cre-
ated systems of administrative adjudication, and provided for judicial review of administrative
action. And the first independent agency at the national level was not the ICC, but the Patent
Office, created ninety-seven years earlier.”); see also Jerry Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Fed-
eral Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J.
1636 (2007); Jerry Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from
Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinafter Mashaw, From Jackson
to Lincoln]; Jerry Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age,
119 YALE L.J. 1362 (2010).
17. See Mashaw, From Jackson to Lincoln, supra note 16, at 1628–1666.
18. See JAMES T. LLOYD, LLOYD’S STEAMBOAT DIRECTORY, AND DISASTERS ON THE WEST-
ERN WATERS 67–79 (1856) (describing this era’s steamboat explosions; for example, the explo-
sions of the Grampus, Helen McGregor, Rob Roy and others). Lloyd’s poignant account of the
Ben Franklin’s demise gives a sense of the horrors involved:
The steamboat Ben Franklin, on the day of this awful occurrence, was backing out from
her wharf at Mobile, in order to make her regular trip to Montgomery. Scarcely had she
disengaged herself from the wharf, when the explosion took place, producing a concus-
sion which seemed to shake the whole city to its foundations. The entire population of
Mobile, alarmed by the terrific detonation, was drawn to the spot to witness a spectacle
which must have harrowed every soul with astonishment and horror. This fine boat,
which had on that very morning floated so gallantly on the bosom of the lake, was now
a shattered wreck, while numbers of her passengers and crew were lying on the decks,
either motionless and mutilated corpses, or agonized sufferers panting and struggling in
the grasp of death.” Id. at 74. “[A]mong the mangled corpses, not a few retained
scarcely any vestige of the human form, so that the identification of particular persons
was impossible.”
Id. at 75. See also Robert Gudmestad, Rise of the Regulatory State: It All Began with Exploding
Riverboats, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/
Op-Ed/2013/02/10/Rise-of-the-regulatory-state-It-all-began-with-exploding-riverboats/stories/
201302100361 (“From 1816 to 1848, a total of 1,433 people died in steamboat accidents along the
western rivers, then defined as any waterway in the Mississippi Valley. The fatality rate on these
boats has been estimated at 155 deaths per 1 million passengers, a figure 1,000 times higher than
travel on modern jet aircraft. While many of these could be blamed on ordinary collisions and
fires, exploding boilers claimed many victims and soon became notorious in the public
imagination.”).
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though, is the scope and rhetorical framing of statutory grants of agency
regulatory power, particularly rulemaking power. Early regulatory man-
dates were “specific authority” grants of rulemaking power.19 Congress
would identify a particular issue and order an agency to promulgate regula-
tions to address that particular congressionally-identified issue. Take, for
example, the relatively contemporary Clean Air Act.20 It charges the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with adopting
regulations “prescrib[ing] . . . standards applicable to the admission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines . . . .”21 Other provisions in the Clean Air Act elaborate to
some extent what those standards are to contain.22 This grant of rulemaking
power, while broad, is nevertheless targeted at a specific subject matter.
Going further back to the New Deal era, the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, both as originally enacted and as amended since, calls upon
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt “rules and regula-
tions” with respect to various substantive requirements “as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”23 For
example, a lengthy provision governing the registration and regulation of
securities brokers and dealers tells the SEC to “establish rules and regula-
tions applicable to securities brokers or dealers, standards of training, expe-
rience, competence and such other qualifications as the commission finds
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors” including but not limited to tests that “include questions relating to
bookkeeping, accounting, internal control over cash and securities, supervi-
sion of employees, maintenance of records, and other appropriate mat-
ters.”24 Again, phrases like “necessary or appropriate in the public interest”
and “for the protection of investors” create ample agency discretion beyond
mere interpretation. Yet, the grants of authority are relatively specific in
what the SEC is being asked to do.
Many regulatory statutes, going back at least to the New Deal era if
not before, also contain “general authority” grants of rulemaking power.25
These grants authorize the head of an agency to adopt “all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of” a statute,26 or other similar wording.27
19. See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1447–49 (making this same point with
examples).
20. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2016).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A) (“The regulations under subsection (a) . . . shall
contain standards which provide that such emissions from such vehicles and engines may not
exceed 1.5 grams per vehicle mile of hydrocarbons and 15.0 grams per vehicle mile of carbon
monoxide.”)
23. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881-909.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(7)(B) (2016).
25. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1447, 1459.
26. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).
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In the 1930s, because of the Panama Refining28 and Schechter Poultry29
cases, general authority grants were not considered delegations of quasi-
legislative rulemaking power because they lacked intelligible principles.30
If a statute says “all necessary rules and regulations for the effectuation of
the act,” where is the intelligible principle in that?
These general authority grants, at least in the 1930s and 1940s, and
even through the 1950s, were thought merely to acknowledge the executive
branch’s constitutional authority to interpret laws in the course of executing
them.31 The executive branch might communicate those interpretations, but
such communications were not considered binding on anyone. They were
merely the executive branch expressing its own views regarding statutory
meaning.
All of that started to change in the 1960s, when rulemaking came into
vogue as more efficient and democratically legitimate than case-by-case im-
plementation of statutes through agency adjudication.32 The nondelegation
doctrine waned as a limitation on Congressional delegations of rulemaking
power.33 Legislation enacted by Congress authorized more agency rulemak-
ing. Agencies asserted their statutory rulemaking powers more broadly.
Courts through decisions like that of the D.C. Circuit in National Petroleum
Refiners Association v. FTC endorsed those assertions of rulemaking
power, either explicitly or implicitly.34 Also, in the 1960s and 1970s, Con-
gress enacted statutes that delegated more and broader discretionary
rulemaking power to agencies.35 So agencies adopted more regulations, and
those regulations became more sweeping in what they tried to accomplish.
The end result is that, since the 1960s and 1970s, agencies have relied on
27. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services
“to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of” the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act); 29 U.S.C. §156 (giving the National Labor Relations Board the “authority from time to time
to make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of” the National Labor Relations Act).
28. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
29. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
30. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1565-67 (2006) (documenting this doctrinal history).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed”).
32. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §1.6 (5th ed. 2010)
(describing factors contributing to the increase); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts,
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 546-49
(2002) (observing the same).
33. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §12 (1976) (maintaining that the
nondelegation doctrine “can not be taken literally”); Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Ad-
ministrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 938 (2006) (“As demonstrated by the past seven decades of case law, the
nondelegation doctrine has become virtually unenforceable.”).
34. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
35. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 819, 824–825 (1988).
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general authority rulemaking grants to adopt regulations filling gaps and
clarifying ambiguities in statutory requirements, and courts have given
those regulations the same legal force as regulations adopted pursuant to
general authority rulemaking grants.
Enter judicial review and Chevron deference. Judges have to review
challenges to the validity of the regulations that agencies adopt.36 But de-
spite an entire toolbox full of traditional tools of statutory construction, not
all exercises of discretionary power are susceptible to common law reason-
ing using those tools of statutory construction. As the late Justice Scalia is
said to have observed, sometimes, law just ends, and you really find your-
self in the realm of policy choice rather than what we think of as legal
interpretation.37 Chevron’s two steps recognize that.38 They recognize that
when law ends, policymaking discretion begins. Chevron’s two steps coun-
sel deference when judges enter this policymaking sphere. This, in some
sense, derives from jurisprudence predating Chevron—courts have been up-
holding reasonable interpretations of specific authority delegations of dis-
cretionary rulemaking power for decades, since at least the 1930s.39 When
given a relatively open-ended specific authority grant which lacks a high-
level of specificity about how agencies should exercise discretion, what is
there for a court to interpret other than whether the agencies’ exercise of
that discretion is reasonable?
What was new with Chevron was the recognition that some delega-
tions might be implicit, as was the case, for example, with the statutory
question at issue in Chevron itself. There, the Supreme Court was presented
with an under-defined statutory term combined with a general grant of
rulemaking power. The case concerned what was known as the “bubble
concept” under the Clean Air Act.40 A permit was required to add or mod-
36. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2011) (allowing suit by party “ad-
versely affected or aggrieved” by agency action).
37. I am paraphrasing a statement made by another scholar, whose identity I have forgotten,
at an academic conference.  I have been unable find the same or close language in print.  But the
phrase seems consistent with Scalia’s articulated views regarding statutory ambiguity—that some-
times “Congress had no particular intent on the [particular statutory question], but meant to leave
its resolution to the agency,” that even more often Congress “didn’t think about the matter at all,”
and that “Chevron is unquestionably better than” de novo review in such instances. Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17
(1989).
38. Chevron asks first whether the meaning of the statute is clear or ambiguous.  If the statute
is ambiguous, then Chevron asks whether the agency’s interpretation is permissible or reasonable.
A reviewing court must defer to the administering agency’s permissible or reasonable interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–843 (1984).
39. See Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate
Strategy?, TEXAS L. REV. 89, 94-96 (2011).
40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841–842; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The
Making of An Accidental Landmark, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 253, 257-58 (2014) (describing the issue
at greater length).
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ify a “stationary source” of emissions.41 The question was basically this: if
a factory had two smokestacks and wanted to build a third, should emis-
sions from the single new smokestack alone or total emissions from all
three smokestacks together count in assessing the need for a permit? If the
former, a permit was required for the new smokestack. If the latter, the
factory might modify its original two smokestacks to ensure that the three
smokestacks together would not emit more than the original two smoke-
stacks did, and thereby avoid the need for a permit.42
The statute did not provide an answer to the question. It defined statio-
nary source,43 but that definition did not address the bubble issue at all. The
legislative history, according to the Court, was completely silent on the
topic.44 The statute did not identify the issue specifically as one for the
agency to address. The general authority rulemaking grant to the EPA was
all the statute offered. The D.C. Circuit invalidated the EPA’s regulation as
inconsistent with the Clean Air Act’s overall purpose of making our air
cleaner.45 Fine, but by relying on the overall purpose of the statute without
recognizing compromises internal to its provisions, the D.C. Circuit’s deci-
sion created a one-way ratchet in interpreting the Clean Air Act. The Court,
disagreeing, counseled deference to the agency instead.46
The other aspect of Chevron that was new was the comparative for-
malism of its two steps. As evidenced by thirty years of jurisprudence, how-
ever, Chevron’s two steps have proven quite slippery. At step one, for
example, how clear is “clear”? Which traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion do we apply to discern statutory clarity before we go on to Chevron’s
step two? Administrative law scholars still argue today about Chevron’s
two steps and how they work, as well as what getting rid of Chevron might
mean for the administrative state.
At the very least, it seems obvious that, in some cases, judges contort
themselves into interpretive pretzels to find clarity in statutory meaning.
Meanwhile, other judges “will find ambiguity in a stop sign.”47 When a
court declines to uphold a controversial interpretation of a statute, some
people will say the court has not been deferential enough. When a court
41. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 n.2 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (1983)).
42. Merrill, supra note 40, at 258-59.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(z).
44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851 (“The 1977 Amendments contain no specific reference to the
‘bubble concept.’”).
45. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726–727 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, . . . federal
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do.”).
47. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1453 & 1455 n.439 (attributing this observation to
an anonymous judge).
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upholds a controversial agency interpretation of a statute, other people will
say the court was too deferential. This is the world Chevron inhabits.
The Chevron standard has never been tightly moored to the text of the
APA. The statute declares that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”48
Yet, Chevron itself talks about the “reasonableness of agency interpreta-
tions,” which courts recognize as the opposite of agencies acting arbitrarily
and capriciously.49 In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, Justice
Scalia—long Chevron’s staunchest advocate—acknowledged that he really
could not reconcile Chevron with the APA’s text.50 If the Court could start
all over again in our more textualist times, it might go a different way.
Enter SOPRA, which seeks to modify section 706 of the APA, again,
for the precise purpose of trying to eliminate Chevron deference. The first
version of SOPRA was adopted by the House of Representatives in 2016.51
It was a very short, little bill—only two sections. The Senate did nothing
with it after the House of Representatives adopted it. This early version of
SOPRA aimed to amend section 706 merely to specify that courts shall
“decide de novo all relevant questions of law.”52 That is it, really—specifi-
cation of de novo review—which of course is lacking in the APA at
present.
My concern with this language is that it misses the target entirely.
True, some judges engage in only the most shallow or superficial efforts at
statutory construction at Chevron step one. But at least in theory, Chevron
itself specifies that step one entails employing traditional tools of statutory
construction to evaluate Congressional intent,53 which sounds a lot like de
novo review. And opinions of the Supreme Court employ virtually every
tool in the statutory interpretation toolbox to find statutory clarity at Chev-
ron step one and thereby avoid step two’s reasonableness inquiry.54 That’s
not every case, certainly, but it is many of them.
In other words, Chevron step one, properly understood, already
strongly resembles de novo review. Justice Scalia more or less argued as
much in a 1989 Duke Law Review article, contending that he rarely found
statutes so ambiguous that he needed to move to Chevron’s deferential sec-
48. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2016).
49. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–864.
50. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (“Heedless of the original design of the APA, we have developed an elaborate law of
deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes and regulations.”).
51. See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong.  (2016).
52. Id. at § 2(3).
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
54. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1423–1428. For glimpses into the toolbox,
compare, for example, the opinions in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014);
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); and F.D.A. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 520 U.S. 120 (2000).
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ond step.55 Yet, again, he acknowledged that sometimes traditional statu-
tory interpretation fails to provide an answer, at which point policy
discretion takes over, and that is when he said deference is appropriate.56
So, if that is the way one reads Chevron, then what does version one of
SOPRA actually accomplish?
SOPRA version two modified and expanded upon the first version of
SOPRA and, in turn, was folded into a larger APA reform bill, the Regula-
tory Accountability Act.57 The House of Representatives has passed this
version as well, but the Senate has not.58 This second version of SOPRA
keeps the same de novo review language adopted in 2016, but adds further,
[I]f the reviewing court determines that a statutory or regulatory
provision relevant to its decision contains a gap or ambiguity, the
court shall not interpret or rely on that gap or ambiguity as an
implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rulemaking author-
ity, or a justification for interpreting agency authority expansively
or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the question of
law.59
This language speaks to the applied delegations theory addressed by Sai
Prakash in connection with this symposium.60 And, as I see it, this language
aims more clearly at the heart of the matter. Remember my suggestion that
the real problem is not Chevron itself but rather congressional delegation of
policymaking discretion.61 As Nick Bednar and I have argued, Chevron is
the wrong target. To the extent one is troubled by Chevron deference, the
real objective ought to be curtailing congressional delegations of discretion-
ary power to administrative agencies.62 The modified SOPRA language
quoted above at least recognizes that delegation is the correct target by in-
structing courts not to consider gaps or ambiguities in statutory provisions
as implicit delegations of legislative rulemaking power. The concern that I
have with this version of SOPRA is that the delegation horse is way, way,
way out of the barn.
As noted above, for decades now, the courts have treated general au-
thority regulations on par with specific authority regulations as legislative
rules. By providing that a statutory gap or ambiguity is not delegation of
55. Scalia, supra note 37, at 520.
56. Id. at 516-17; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (making the same point).
57. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. tit. II (2017).
58. On March 29, 2017, the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship held
hearings. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the S. Comm. on
Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship, 115th Cong. (2017).
59. H.R. 5, tit. II § 202.
60. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Past, Present, and Future of Presidential Power,
14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 627 (2018).
61. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
62. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1392 (“The real ‘problem’—to the extent one
sees it as such—is not Chevron but rather unhappiness with the natural consequences of congres-
sional reliance on agencies to resolve major policy issues.”).
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legislative rulemaking power, SOPRA seems to suggest that decades of
general authority regulations no longer carry the legal force of legislative
rules.  Other Regulatory Accountability Act provisions preserve the existing
distinction between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules—i.e., interpre-
tive rules or policy statements that are exempt from APA procedural re-
quirements for rulemaking63—without suggesting that we alter how we
distinguish legislative rules from nonlegislative rules.
Yet the revised SOPRA language seems to do exactly that. By stating
that statutory gaps and ambiguities are not implicit delegations of legisla-
tive rulemaking authority,64 the revised SOPRA seems to be reinstituting
the old notion that general grants of rulemaking power do not authorize
agencies to adopt legally-binding, legislative rules. Given that we have
around fifty years of general authority regulations that we recognize as le-
gally binding, where does that leave us? What happens when you down-
grade thousands of regulations governing primary behavior and extending
government benefits from binding law to mere advice? Perhaps the revised
SOPRA means only to make this characterization with respect to the stan-
dard of review, and does not mean to reclassify general authority regula-
tions as nonlegislative rules that are exempt from APA rulemaking
procedures and that lack legal force.  The legislation simply is not clear on
this point, and that lack of clarity risks raising doubts regarding the ongoing
validity of decades of general authority regulations.65
I am at least concerned that SOPRA, whether out of petulance over
supposedly “bad” applications of Chevron deference or a desire for a quick
fix for executive overreach, does not engage in the careful but admittedly
more difficult exercise of amending each individual statute to specify and
clarify what discretionary powers Congress wants the administering agency
to have. Instead, with very general and over-inclusive language, SOPRA
could generate an earthquake of truly epic proportions to those who depend
upon the consistency of the laws that govern them.
The solution may lie in the Senate’s arguably cooler heads. We do not
have anything from the Senate yet. It has been suggested to me by people
closer to the Senate than I am that the Senate will not go along with getting
rid of Chevron deference, and that may be the case. An earlier version of
the Regulatory Accountability Act proposed by Senator Rob Portman in
2015 modified section 706 of the APA in various ways, but none of those
modifications concerned judicial review of agencies’ interpretations of stat-
utes.66 The Senate has not enacted SOPRA, and its version of the Regula-
tory Accountability Act does not include either version of SOPRA.67
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2016).
64. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. tit. II (2017).
65. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1460.
66. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, S. 2006, 114th Cong. § 4 (2015).
67. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Maybe we are headed for a showdown between the Senate and the House
on this. One last question: does any of this matter? That in and of itself is
the subject of quite a bit of debate. One school of thought says getting rid of
Chevron will reallocate power between the judiciary and the executive
branch and restore the judiciary to its proper role.68 Others think that very
little would change. Political scientists and empirical analysis suggest that
the standard of review makes very little difference in actual case out-
comes.69 My own view lies somewhere in the middle. In many or even most
cases, the standard of review will not matter.  In at least some cases, it will.
But once a statutory question crosses into the policymaking sphere,
many if not most judges and justices are uncomfortable with making what
they recognize as fundamentally policy-based decisions rather than tradi-
tional interpretive ones. In such cases, their inclination will be to defer to
the agency. What tools will we give courts for expressing why they are
deciding cases as they are? Will we going to make courts document some
sort of fig leaf reliance on statutory text, history, and purpose as substantiat-
ing the outcome of a particular case? Or, will we let courts acknowledge
that they are, in fact, deferring in some cases? Will we admit that, some-
times, resolving statutory ambiguity really does represent policymaking
rather than interpretation, and accept that it is not the courts’ job to make
those policy choices?
Chevron allows transparency in judicial decision-making. It allows
courts to signal when they feel like a particular decision falls within the
policymaking sphere. If we are not willing to pursue the difficult task of
curtailing congressional delegations of policymaking discretion to agencies,
then acknowledging the reality of agency policymaking discretion and per-
mitting that transparency in judicial decisionmaking can only benefit of our
democratic principles and our Constitution.
68. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1240–42
(2016) (theorizing the implications of eliminating Chevron deference).
69. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (surveying studies and concluding that practical differ-
ences among standards of review are negligible). But see Mark J. Richards, Joseph L. Smith &
Herbert M. Kritzer, Does Chevron Matter?, 28 L. & POL’Y 444, 445 (2006) (arguing that “atti-
tudes matter” and the Supreme Court evaluated key case factors differently before and after
Chevron).
